china nuclear doctrine

The People's Republic of China has developed and possesses weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons.The first of China's nuclear weapons tests took place in 1964, and its first hydrogen bomb test occurred in 1967. For example, if another country launches long-range precision conventional attacks against China’s nuclear infrastructure, China should regard it as a nuclear attack and conduct a nuclear counterattack against the country.49, If China and the United States can reach an agreement on a no-first-use commitment, China will not seek to be the United States’ peer in terms of number of weapons,50 and will even reduce its nuclear arsenal because China “regards the no-first-use of nuclear weapons as one of the principles of nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament.”51 If the United States refuses to commit and maintains a large nuclear arsenal or deploys more interceptors as part of its missile defense system, China will have to increase its arsenal of nuclear warheads to some extent. In an increasingly crowded, chaotic, and contested world and marketplace of ideas, the Carnegie Endowment offers decisionmakers global, independent, and strategic insight and innovative ideas that advance international peace. China's nuclear doctrine is the product of four different schools of thought: the self-defensive nuclear doctrine, the minimum nuclear deterrence doctrine, the counter-nuclear coercion doctrine, and, finally, a doctrine of limited deterrence. The U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China offers access in PDF format to the three volume, unclassified version of its final report. 8 Li Bin, “Identifying China’s Nuclear Strategy,” World Economics and Politics, no. [38] Bill Gertz, "China Nuclear Transfer Exposed: Hill Expected to Urge Sanction," The Washington Times, 5 February 1996, via: http://web.lexis-nexis.com. Since China developed atomic weapons, China has made it very clear that it will not use nuclear weapons first at any time and under any circumstance. China's policy is one of assured retaliation with a no-first-use pledge designed to deter nuclear attack and coercion. In this scenario, China would defend its own territory against a land invasion by exploiting its advantages in manpower and geography. They must report this status to the CMC headquarters.24 After firing their missiles, the unit commanders are to disperse and get the results of post-firing reconnaissance and new intelligence.25, Combat orders for a first-class warning must come through special command-department channels of the Second Artillery Corps or the PLA General Staff Department, but only the CMC can send a launch order.26 The combat order gives a current friendly and enemy situation, the status of the war, a determination on the use of nuclear force, the combat objectives for an attack, and the limits of an attack.27 The actual firing order will contain the time limits for each unit to fire and instructions for post-firing movement and disposition.28. The Chinese had little to propose as a defense against a strategic nuclear attack except improvement of air defenses and the dispersal, hardening and camouflage of military targets. Conventional strategy and weapons would eventually dominate in a long war of attrition. minimum, deterrent against Soviet or United States nuclear attack. Iran nuclear deal: What's next for the JCPOA? "No first use" for China does not withstand the test of common sense. technological advances in weaponry. In the early 1960's, this campaign was expanded to include heavy industries. 6, 1 November 2011, pp. The most significant foundation for China’s national defense is the concept of people’s war. 33 Quoted in Bill Gertz, “First Strike,” Washington Free Beacon, April 26, 2013, http://freebeacon.com/first-strike/. . Neoclassical Realism and the Underdevelopment of China s Nuclear Doctrine This book addresses the under-researched discourse of the evolution of Chinese nuclear posture, and in particular, explains the absence from this evolution of a coherent and well-defined operational doctrine. China China's nuclear deterrence doctrine has been in synchrony with its conventional warfighting doctrine. As Deng Xiaoping said, “Our strategy has always been defense and we will continue its strategic defense in the next twenty years, in which nuclear submarines are also weapons of strategic defense.” Because ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are the most important second-strike force, China can have better nuclear retaliation capability and be more confident about its no-first-use policy if it improves its SSBNs. 40-48. At this status, units must move to firing positions (or at least prepare to move), many of which may be tunnels or prepared underground, protected positions. Therefore, a no-first-use policy could affect the results of wars in the future. 1776 Eye Street, NW People's War denotes the most traditional vision and derives from Mao Tse-tung's doctrine. China. For example, if the United States increases the number of interceptors in its strategic missile defense system, China has to increase its arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles in order to maintain parity and an assured second strike. “The current development, especially the deployment of missile-defense systems in East Asia would be, in Chinese eyes, would be a very, very disturbing factor having implications for the calculation of China’s nuclear and strategic arsenal,” she said at a conference at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.44. Contents: China?s Nuclear Future in a Changing Environment?the Editors. Culture, Strategy, and Security?C.A. Cleary. Evolving Nuclear Doctrine?E.S. Medeiros. Strategic Force Modernization?P.C. Saunders and J. Yuan. 31 Xia Liping, “US Conventional Prompt Global Strike Plan Under the Perspective of High Frontiers Theory,” International Review,no.5 (2014): 5. China. W. Freeman [a former Clinton administration assistant secretary of defense who had served as President Nixon's interpreter in Beijing in 1972] was told by Lt. Gen. Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of China's general staff: The Gulf War of early 1991 was a big eye-opener to PRC military. Liu says that minimal nuclear deterrence is compatible with China's strategic culture. In the late 1970s, Chinese military leaders began to modify PLA Nuclear doctrine and policy. Subsequent events caused further schism and in 1959 apparently contributed in large degree to a renewed policy debate among the Peking leadership and the dismissal of the Minister of National Defense and four vice ministers. 49 Xu Nengwu and Huang Changyun, “Space Deterrence: U.S. Strategic Deterrence System Readjustment and Global Strategic Stability,” Foreign Affairs Review,no. Found insidePresenting technical concepts with minimal jargon in a straightforward style, this book will be of use to casual China watchers and military experts alike. Massive PLA mobilisation has . Lets just use common sense for a moment here, if America nukes China and want China to not target its cities, would it target Chinese cities or . 21 Xue Xinglin, Zhanyi Lilun Xuexi Zhinan [A guide to the study of campaign theory](Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2002), 387–8. . Also, some in China are questioning whether the doctrine of "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons serves China's deterrent needs. An Evolving Nuclear Doctrine? China's nuclear build-up: The great distraction By Rose Gottemoeller, Opinion ContributorSeptember 13, 2021 - 02:30 PM EDT The views expressed by contributors are their own and not the view of The Hill President Biden is reviewing America's nuclear posture. [35] People's Republic of China, "Instrument of Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," 11 March 1992. Given that nuclear arsenals are increasingly viewed as a critical assurance of military supremacy and security, this book distils the evolving trends in China's nuclear doctrine and strategy, and chronicles the journey of a nuclear China, ... Washington, DC 20036-2103. The Chinese nuclear arsenal has stayed at the minimal size intended for self-defense because China has taken a very restrained attitude toward the development of nuclear weapons. 40, no. China's nuclear doctrine has experienced a process of evolution from anti-nuclear blackmail China’s nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC). 37 Song Miou, “Full Text: China’s Military Strategy,” Xinhuanet, May 26, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-05/26/c_134271001_4.htm. China has adopted a new nuclear doctrine during the past 5-10 years of limited nuclear deterrence. The PLA's strategic considerations call for avoidance of wars, major ones in particular. China’s land-based strategic nuclear force can retaliate in as few as ten minutes after a nuclear strike, and soldiers from the Second Artillery Corps can live in bunkers for up to a month after a strike. The current efforts of China appear to be aimed at maintaining a survivable nuclear force by, for example, using solid-fuelled ICBMs in silos rather than liquid-fuelled missiles. No first use of nuclear weapons has strategic significance and is based on deep consideration. There is some ambiguity over the conditions under which China’s [no-first-use] policy would apply, including whether strikes on what China considers its own territory, demonstration strikes, or high altitude bursts would constitute a first use,” the report said.33 “Moreover, some PLA officers have written publicly of the need to spell out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons first; for example, if an enemy’s conventional attack threatened the survival of China’s nuclear force, or of the regime itself. are limited and its nuclear doctrine remains static. [2] Although the exact size of China's nuclear stockpile has not been publicly disclosed, reports . Even before the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, issued his latest round of . It was used by the Communists against the nationalist government in the Anti-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. It was initially based on self-defence during the era of "people's war". It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. shorter-range) nuclear forces, and an offensively configured, war-fighting posture for its . 3. China is implementing regulations establishing controls over nuclear-related dual-use items in 1998. Found insideThis book provides a comprehensive overview of the state of nuclear arsenals, nuclear ambitions and nuclear threats across different parts of Asia. In 1996, it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and agreed to seek an international ban on the production of fissile nuclear weapons material. China’s nuclear strategy is subject to the state’s nuclear policy and military strategy. As pointed out by Indian, Chinese and US experts, neither China nor India has sought to insert nuclear dynamics into border tensions. [29] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 53 Compared to the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, China is less likely to pursue military and coercive advantages from limited first use . For a study on China's nuclear doctrine see Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, "Assuring Assured Retaliation: China's Nuclear Posture and US-China Strategic Stability", International Security, vol. 36 “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, April 16, 2013, 6. Chinese thinking about nuclear war continued to be concerned with defense, and survival. A decade ago, many scholars and policy analysts who followed China dismissed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as an antiquated force that was essentially infantry, fighting with decades-old weapons, poor communications, and World War II era doctrine. Found insideFinally, it addresses the latent capability to produce nuclear weapons that would inevitably exist after abolition, and asks whether this is a barrier to disarmament, or whether it can be managed to meet the security needs of a world newly ... NATO chief urges China to join nuclear arms control talks Associated Press. In March of 1992, China formally undertook to abide by the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the multinational effort to restrict the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. It has never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.16. Since China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, it has adopted a relatively moderate and restrained nuclear policy, even as the Soviet Union and the United States engaged in a nuclear arms race. China attended the May 1997 meeting of the NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee as an observer and became a full member in October 1997. Copyright 2021. The subsequent trend of thought concerning what became known as "revolution in military affairs" impacted even more sharply on PLA leaders' thinking, making them see distinctly that high technologies were already the foremost key to determine the outcome of any war. 2, (2015): 7-50. 1 Sun Xiangli, “China’s Nuclear Strategy: Nature and Characteristics,” World Economics and Politics, no. [34] "中国政府原则决定参加不扩散核武器条约 [The Chinese Government Decides in Principle to Join the NPT]," Renmin Ribao, 11 August 1991, via: www.xinhuanet.com. A Chinese professor interviewed on condition of anonymity suggested to policy planners that China should consider a nuclear response if its strategic systems were attacked, even if that attack was by conventional means.29 Both the PLA and central government policy planners were cool to this idea, the professor said.30. 10 Gao Yan, “From Local War Under the High-Tech Conditions to the Assured Destruction Under Nuclear Situation—China’s Current Military Strategy Should Turn to the Comprehensive Nuclear Deterrence,” Tianya Forum, July 2004, http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-worldlook-101455-1.shtml. 19 Hui Zhang, “China’s Nuclear Weapons Modernization: Intentions, Drivers, and Trends,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,July 15, 2012, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22292/chinas_nuclear_weapons_modernization.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F13%2Fhui_zhang. China's nuclear forces were also technologically outmoded and fixed to silo or tunnel . Al Jazeera. . Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was sworn in as president of Taiwan on May 20, 2016. Download complete article here: Shankar, The Grandmaster's Pawn Excerpts: The Chinese Arsenal A keen observer of international relations in the South and East Asian region soon comes to the . promote progress by China on nonproliferation. strategy--Chinese strategy was designed to defeat a Soviet invasion its nuclear weapons develohinking on issues related to nuclear doctrine, command and pment. Suite 600 The PLA emphasized military [31] Mingquan Zhu, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," The Nonproliferation Review, vol. Why India wants to break its decades-old nuclear pledge. Nonetheless, it is also apparent that nuclear strategists chafe at the doctrine and younger strategists, in particular, leave open in their writings the possibility that China may have to move away from this doctrine.”32, The Pentagon’s 2010 annual report on the Chinese military said, “The no-first-use nuclear policy is ambiguous and Chinese officials have not clarified it. NFU for China does not withstand the test of common sense. The way these debates are eventually resolved will have important consequences for the future of China’s doctrine and arsenal. 46 Liping, “On China’s Nuclear Doctrine,” 189. In recent years, the United States has made significant progress in developing its Conventional Prompt Global Strike capability.45 Because the United States can launch conventional strikes against China’s nuclear infrastructure, China has to create new options to deal with attacks in the future, perhaps by adding some conditions to its no-first-use policy. Fred Kaplan, hailed by The New York Times as “a rare combination of defense intellectual and pugnacious reporter,” takes us into the White House Situation Room, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s “Tank” in the Pentagon, and the vast ... Surrounded by nuclear armed adversaries, recent latest technologies induction into India's defence set up (INS Arihant, Dassault Rafale) gives its nuclear option a boost for full fledged retaliations. Such . Unless such conditions are favorable, states are unlikely to take initiatives to either reduce or eliminate their nuclear weapons stockpiles. This book examines the geopolitical necessities which will encourage nuclear disarmament globally. Historically, Chinese leaders have emphasized that a credible second-strike capability would be sufficient to deter an attack on China and placed the bulk of their efforts into ensuring the survivability of their nuclear arsenal. [27] Xia Fei, "三线建设:毛泽东的一个重大战略决策 [Third Line Construction: One of Mao's Important Strategic Decisions]," News of the Communist Party of China, 2008, http://dangshi.people.com.cn. Some officers in the People's Liberation Army have . China's current nuclear arsenal contains approximately 200 . China is interested in both “strategic reassurance” and “mutual strategic restraint” between China and the United States.55 China and the United States are developing a new model of major-power relations, which should be characterized by peace, lack of confrontation, mutual respect, cooperation, and mutual benefit. China has maintained a doctrine of minimum deterrence since its first nuclear test in 1964. China’s approach to nuclear deterrence has been broadly consistent since its first test in 1964, but it has recently accelerated nuclear force modernization. China has stuck to the principle of limited development for its nuclear weapons, attaching a lot of importance to building a lean and effective strategic nuclear missile force. China became the first nation to propose and pledge NFU policy when it first gained nuclear capabilities in 1964, stating "not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances." During the Cold War, China decided to keep the size of its nuclear arsenal small, rather than compete in an international arms race with the United States and the Soviet Union. active defense--tactically offensive action with a defensive Cyberweapons raise a similar question: how should China respond if its nuclear infrastructure is disabled by a cyberattack? The policy of no first use is beneficial because it encourages the international community to share this objective. capability in the early 1980s, provided Beijing with a credible, if T control and safety and security etc was virtually non-existent until after the nuclear tests in May 1998. But whatever the sources of China's nuclear doctrine, misperceptions about it continue to endure. strategy of "luring in deep" in a protracted war, and it took into 9 (2006): 28. This thesis argues that despite China's official declaration of no-first-use (NFU), there is a considerably weak firebreak in the country's nuclear posture that is likely to promote strategic nuclear-first-use during crisis. China's alleged nuclear "no first use" doctrine, like the USSR's during the Cold War, is almost certainly disinformation. Efforts to describe China’s doctrine in relation to Western ideas preclude a more in-depth understanding of China’s special case. By that, China means that it will not seek to amass a large nuclear arsenal for the purpose of global hegemony.”52. Found insideBased on primary-source research and interviews, this book will be important reading for scholars and students of nuclear deterrence and India's international relations, as well as for military, defense contractor, and policy audiences both ... Gao Yan, a writer of military science, wrote in 2004 that China’s current limited nuclear deterrence doctrine should evolve into comprehensive nuclear deterrence due to the nuclear threats from the United States over the issue of Taiwan.10, Mulvenon wrote, “More recent Chinese writings call for an aspirational doctrine of ‘limited deterrence’ (youxian weishe) comprised of counterforce, warfighting capabilities ‘to deter conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear war, and to control and suppress escalation during a nuclear war.’”11 But, he admitted, “The majority of available evidence suggests, however, that the modernization of China’s strategic nuclear forces is intended primarily to improve the country’s survivability, thus enhancing the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent.”12, Mulvenon argued in 1995 and 1996 that “some Chinese strategists have advocated the development of limited nuclear warfighting capabilities.”13 He wrote in 1995 that China would place more importance on the capability to respond to different scales and levels of military threats, known as classification deterrence, and would turn to limited deterrence.14 For this reason, Johnson projected that China would develop a larger and more diverse arsenal including tactical nuclear weapons, and may revise both the no-first-use policy and second-strike-only mode of operation.15. . Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of regional power nuclear strategies, this book demonstrates that these strategies matter greatly to international stability and it provides new insights into conflict dynamics across ... Found insideThis report analyzes international and domestic factors that will affect China's approach to nuclear deterrence, how those drivers may evolve over the next 15 years, and what impact they are likely to have. For instance, a force posture dominated by a meaningful no-first-use doctrine should have a much smaller and simpler arsenal with a much lower alert status. A decade ago, many scholars and policy analysts who followed China dismissed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as an antiquated force that was essentially infantry, fighting with decades-old weapons, poor communications, and World War II era doctrine. [43] Lin Shu-yuan, "Taiwan, China to Enhance Cooperation in Nuclear Safety," Central News Agency (Taiwan), 5 April 2011. "China's military doctrine — including numerous examples presented here of using HEMP attack to win on . Such a defense-in-depth would require 4 Rong Yu and Hong Yuan, “The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy: From Anti-Nuclear Deterrence to Minimum Deterrence,” Contemporary Asia-Pacific, no. . Hui Zhang added that China’s modernization also extends to its sea-based deterrent: “China will speed up the modernization of its sea-based strategic force to secure a second-strike force in the coming years.”54 China has been developing a third generation of strategic nuclear submarines, which is called the Type-096 Tang-class. China has always kept its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for maintaining its national security. China’s nuclear doctrine exists in service of the national development strategy, national security strategy, national defense policy and military strategy of China.46 “Nuclear weapons have been playing an important role in China’s national and military strategy. [42] U.S. Department of Defense, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," April 2013, www.defense.gov. China's Strategic Arsenal is essential reading for an up-to-date and comprehensive volume that provides judicious insights about China's nuclear doctrine, strategy, and capabilities, including opportunities for arms control." ― Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies, Georgetown University, and former National Security Council Senior Director for . Check your email for details on your request. Washington, DC 20006, Help take nuclear weapons off of hair-trigger alert with NTI Game, Machine Learning Boosts Capacity to Expose Illicit Nuclear Trade, A Year Like No Other: NTI’s Annual Report Highlights Progress in 2020, intercontinental ballistic mssiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment plant in Lanzhou, gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment facility at Heping, plutonium production reactor and extraction facility at Guangyuan, nuclear weapon design facility at Mianyang, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Actively modernizing the delivery systems of its nuclear triad, Not a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the MTCR or the Australia Group, Approximately 700,000 Japanese chemical weapons munitions abandoned on Chinese territory after WWII. 3 (2009): 244–70. Finally, China’s ultimate goal for developing nuclear weapons is to destroy nuclear weapons. Historical Background. . . The highest readiness status is first-class warning. Her promise to pursue Taiwan’s independence from China will inevitably strain relations between the United States and China, and may lead to Chinese-U.S. armed conflict. United States. Since the end of the Cold War, both the United States and Russia have reduced their strategic nuclear weapons such that it is possible to avoid a nuclear arms race. China's nuclear forces were also technologically outmoded and fixed to silo or tunnel launch sites. Very little information was available about China's "Second Artillery Corps," as China calls its strategic rocket forces. China's National Defense in 2006, White Paper, December 29, 2006; White Paper on China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, September 2005; White Paper on China's National Defense in 2004, December 2004 Sign up to receive emails from Carnegie’s South Asia Program! Since the end of the Cold War, new strategic factors have challenged China’s dedication to no first use. In order to successfully deter other countries from launching nuclear attacks against China, China maintains a strategic nuclear force with the means to retaliate against nuclear strikes. envisaged a forward defense, that is, near the border, to prevent The Americans generally believe that nuclear deterrence is a defensive posture while the Chinese criticize the offensive nature of nuclear deterrence…. You are leaving the website for the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy and entering a website for another of Carnegie's global centers. which came to include nuclear weapons as well as artillery, combat However, there has been no indication that national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China’s no-first-use doctrine.”34 Mark Schneider of the National Institute for Public Policy even quoted what Sha Zukang, former Chinese ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, said in August 2006—that if the Taiwanese declared independence, “[China] will do the business at any cost”—as evidence that the policy of no first use does not apply to Taiwan.35, The Chinese State Council Information Office omitted a reference to its no-first-use policy in the nuclear doctrine section of the 2013 white paper on China’s national defense, which was unveiled on April 16, 2013. This book discusses the nuclear dilemma from various countries' points of view: from Japan, Korea, the Middle East, and others. The final chapter proposes a new solution for the nonproliferation treaty review. before it could penetrate deeply into China. Found insideChina's Evolving Military Strategy aims to bring knowledge of these important developments to a mass audience of China watchers, policymakers, and the broader foreign policy community by providing a sector-by-sector analysis of changes in ... Chinese national security has depended mainly on a foreign policy of peace and the integrated power of people’s war.17 Nuclear force is one of the most important pillars of China’s armed forces. Until about 1987, China postured its nuclear capability to achieve a "minimum deterrence." This term contrasted China's nuclear posture with that of the United States and the Soviet Union, which maintained "maximum deterrent" postures based on . China's nuclear deterrence doctrine has been in synchrony with its conventional warfighting doctrine. In 1996, China committed not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. conventional and nuclear warfare. [1] China has since consistently asserted that its nuclear doctrine is based on the concept of no-first-use, and Chinese military leaders have characterized the country's nuclear weapons as a minimum deterrent against nuclear attacks. such as exchanging deployment plans and information about nuclear doctrine. NFU for China does not withstand the test of common sense. On 07 August 1971, Peking rejected a Soviet proposal for the convening of a five-power conference, to include the US, the USSR, China, Great Britain, and France, to discuss the question of nuclear disarmament. 52 Li Bin, “Chinese Thinking on Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control Today, December 3, 2015, https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_12/Features/Chinese-Thinking-On-Nuclear-Weapons. 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